Carol Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Carol Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North
America : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
M. David Eckersley; Attorney for Plaintiff;
H. James Clegg; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, No. 18184 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2846
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL HOFFMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Supreme Court No. 18184 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, 
Defendant and Respondent.: 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE 
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER PRESIDING 
M. David Eckersley 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY 
510 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
H. James Clegg 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Ft LED 
MARZ 5 i98Z 
_______________________ _....-..... 
.,..._.Ci:;~ Supreme Court. Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL HOFFMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, 
Defendant and Respondent.: 
Supreme Court No. 18184 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE 
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER PRESIDING 
M. David Eckersley 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY 
510 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
H. James Clegg _ 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Statement of the Nature of the Case ... 
Disposition of the Court Belief .. 
Relief Sought on Appeal. 
Facts. • 
Argument and Authority 
POINT I. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE INSURED'S DEATH DID NOT OCCUR BY 
ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INSURANCE 
1 
1 
1 
2 
POLICY IN QUESTION. . . . • . . • . . . 8 
POINT II. AN INDIVIDUAL WHO, BY REASON OF 
MENTAL IMPAIRMENT, CANNOT RATIONALLY EVAL-
UATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS CONDUCT NOR 
CONTROL HIS ACTIONS CANNOT BE DEEMED TO 
HAVE INTENDED OR FORESEEN THE NATURAL OR 
PROBABLE RESULTS OF HIS CONDUCT • . 13 
Conclusion 
. CASES CTTED 
Beckham v. · 'Traveler·s Tns·. · Co. , 
424 Pa. 107, 225 A.2d 532 (1967) •• 
. Continental· ca·s·ualty Company v •. Maguire, 
471 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1970) •..• · · • · • 
Handley v. · MutuaT Life Tris. Co. , 
106 Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319 (1944) .• • • • • • 
Harvey v. St. Pa·u1 we· stern· Tris. Co. , 
166 So.2d 822 (Fla. App. 1964) •...•• 
Kellog v. California Western Life Tns .· Co. , 
201 P.2d 949 (Utah 1949) •.• 
Kobylakiewicz v. Prude·ntial Tns. Co., 
180 A. 491 (N.J. 1935) .• • • 
Mohn·v. American CasuaTtY Co., 
4 5 8 Pa. 5 7 6 , 3 2 6 A. 2d 3 4 6 ( 19} 4) • · 
18 
12 
14 
16 
11 
17 
14 
10,12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sanders v. Metrop·oli tan Life Tn·s·. Co., 
104 Utah 75, 138 P.2d 239 (1943) •. 
Tuttle v. Towa State Travel·ing· Me·n'·s Ass'n, 
10 4 N. W. 1131 (Iowa 19 0 5 ) . . • • . • 
Wetzel v. Westinghouse Electric co·rp. , 
393 A.2d 470 (Pa. 1978) •••••... 
Whatcott v •· Continenta'l Cas.· Co., 
85 Utah 406, 39 P.2d 733 (1935). 
Williams v. Prude·ntial Tns .. Co., 
2 71 I 11 . A pp • 5 3 2 ( 19 3 3 ) • • • . 
ANNOTATI'ONS CrTED 
Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1120 (1973) 
Annot. , 4 9 A. L. R. 3d 6 7 ( 19 7 3) . 
9,10,12 
15 
12 
17 
15 
9 
8,9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL HOFFMAN I 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Supreme Court No. 18184 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA I 
Defendant and Respondent.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
-STATEMENT OF 'THE NATURE OF 'THE :CASE 
This is an action on a contract of insurance seeking payment 
of certain benefits due as a result of the accidental death of ap-
pellant's spouse, Louis Hoffman. 
DISPOSTTION OF 'THE :COURT BELIEF 
Following a nonjury trial before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, 
the court below entered judgment for defendant, no cause of action . 
. RELTEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests that the judgment entered be-
low be reversed and the matter remanded to the court below with in-
structions to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $50,000.00 
plus prejudgment interest from the date of April 9, 1979 to the date 
of judgment. 
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FACTS 
The essential facts of this case are not disputed by the 
parties. The parties stipulated that Carol Hoffman had a policy of 
accident insurance in force with the Life Insurance Company of North 
America which provided for payment to her of $50, 000. 00 in the event 
of the accidental death of her husband, Louis Hoffman, at the time 
he was killed on February 5, 1979. The sole question in this action 
was whether the manner in which Mr. Hoffman died was an accident 
within the meaning of the policy. The parties stipulated that 
Hoffman died as a direct result of being shot by Salt Lake City polic 
officers Frank Hatton-Ward and Gilbert Salazar. (R. 112) 
The events which led to Mr. Hoffman's fatal encounter with the 
officers began on the eveni!lg of February 5, 1979, when Mrs. Hoffman 
informed her husband that they needed to have a serious discussion 
because she had consulted a lawyer regarding divorce. Mr. Hoffman, 
who had been having mental problems for which he was being treated 
by Dr. Robert Mohr, became agitated at this point and went to the base 
ment of the family house and obtained a pistol. He went outside the 
home, while Carol Hoffman was telephoning for police assistance, and 
when asked by his daughter if the gun was loaded he fired the pistol 
in the air. He then got into the family vehicle, a jeep "Cherokee" 
wagon, and drove off. 
Salt Lake City police officer Lorraine Killpack responded to 
Mrs. Hoffman's call, and after discussing the situation with the ap-
pellant and her daughter, Karee, began an attempt to locate Mr. 
Hoffman, which included arranging for his descripti~n and that of the 
-2-
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vehicle he was driving to be transmitted to other city officers. 
Sometime thereafter, approximately an hour from the time of 
Mrs. Hoffman's initial call, officer Killpack observed Mr. Hoffman 
drive by his home at 426 Redondo Avenue, where she was parked and 
waiting. When he didn't stop, she began following him and requested 
the assistance of other officers. Officers Salazar and Hatton-Ward 
responded to this call. At approximately the intersection of 700 
East and 2100 South all three officers were behind the Hoffman vehi-
cle and an attempt was made to pull him over. (R. 208-210) Mr. 
Hoffman didn't .respond to the officers' lights and sirens by pulling 
over, but instead proceeded to drive onto the freeway, exit at State 
Street, and then drive over· a circuitous route back to his home at 
426 Redondo. He wasn't speeding during the "chase" and the whole 
journey only took about 5 minutes~ (R. 137, 138) 
When Mr. Hoffman arrived at his house he pulled his car down 
the driveway. The officers all parked their vehicles near the street. 
Officers Hatton-Ward and Salazar approached Mr. Hoffman's vehicle from 
the northwest on foot, unitl both were positioned on the passenger's 
side at the front door window, which was rolled down (R. 140-142, 160-
161). Officer Killpack got out of her car and approached Mr. Hoffman's 
vehicle, stopping on the driver's side at the rear (northeast) corner 
of car. (R. 210-211) 
From this point there is a divergence in the testimony of the 
officers concerning what 'transpired. Officer Salazar testified that 
from his position at the passenger's window he saw Mr. Hoffman seated 
behind the wheel with a pistol in his right hand, positioned level 
-3-
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with the steering wheel and pointed up in the air. (R. 142) He testi· 
fied that Mr. Hoffman "pi voted" his shoulders both directions and thei;: 
pointed the gun at Salazar and Hatton-Ward, whereupon Salazar shot 
Hoffman. (R. 143-144) 
Hatton-Ward testified that when he arrived at the passenger's 
window and saw Hoffman with the gun he began yelling at him to "drop 
the gun. " He testified, however, that Hoffman never pointed the gun 
in his direction (or that of Salazar), but that Hoffman got out of thE 
vehicle and turned in such a fashion that the pistol was pointing dom 
the driveway where Hatton-Ward felt other officers would be located 
(though he wasn_' t aware of anyone actually being there). Because of 
this assumed threat to others, Hatton-Ward shot Hoffman three or four 
times. Hatton-Ward testified he fired once before he heard Salazar's 
shot, which was the first time he became aware of Salazar's presence. 
(R. 165-169) Hatton-Ward testified that he actually fired when he 
couldn't see the pistol Hoffman was holding. 
Q. When Mr. Hoffman pivoted to get out of the 
car, at some point you lost sight of the weapon that 
he had in his hand, didn't you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Passed between your line of vision and his 
body? 
A.· That's correct. 
Q. And it was at that point when you fired? 
A. That's correct. 
(R. 167) 
-4-
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Officer Killpack, who was positioned at the rear of the vehicle 
at a spot Hatton-Ward felt that the gun was in the process of being 
pointed; testified she was commanding Hoffman to get out of the car 
(R. 211), and that when he did he had the gun pointed at the ground, 
held in his right hand with his elbow up at shoulder level. This was 
his position when shot. She made these observations from a distance 
of four feet. (R. 214) 
At the time of trial, Dr. Robert Mohr, a psychiatrist, testified 
that he had recently been treating Mr. Hoffman for serious mental ill-
ness, which he diagnosed as high paranoia. He described Mr. Hoffman 
as extrem~ly agitated and psychotic. 
·Q. Let me interrupt you. When you say psycho-
tic, define what you mean by that term for the Court. 
A. A psychotic individual, is an individual who 
is reality testing. He is de.fective in one or more 
areas. These areas of lack of reality testing can 
overlap or they can be fairly circumscribed in a 
grossly psychotic individual. Now, the high paranoid 
usually has a specific delusional system, which Mr. 
Hoffman did. And it extended into a number of dif£er-
ent areas, but at the time that I saw him it was 
really all inclusive. I think all of the areas of 
his thinking were really pretty mixed. 
q. You indicate that there are certain charac-
teristics of a person who is grossly psychotic. Did 
you make that diagnosis about Mr. Hoffman? 
-5-
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A. Yes. I did. 
Q. Did you ever draw any conclusion as to the 
necessity of a more aggressive treatment for Mr. 
Hoffman? 
A. Well, from the first time that I saw him, 
I suggested that he let me treat him at the hospital. 
And he refused that immediately. And of course as 
you would note from the dates of treatment, I saw him 
every day or when he would permit. 
Q. What were the c-ircurnstances of that inter-
view, Doctor? 
A. Well, the intensity and severeness of the 
illness, and my attempt to_ gain his conf.idence and 
get him into a hospital where he wouldn't be a dan-
ger to himself or to others. 
Q. In this period of time when you were seeing 
Mr. Hoffman, did you draw any conclusions about whether 
or not he was delusional during that period? 
A. I did. 
Q. And what was your conclusion? 
A. He was profoundly delusional. 
Q. Doctor, assuming that the last day you in-
dicated that you saw Mr. Hoffman, which was February 
5, 1979, was the day of his death, [do] you have an 
opinion as to whether or not Mr. Hoffman on that date 
-6-
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was suffering from a mental impairment 'which 
would inhibit his ability to make rational de-
cisions about the consequences of his conduct? 
A. I do. 
Q. And what is that opinion? 
A. That he was psychotic and at that time not 
able to make sound, rational judgments. 
Q. For the purpose of my next question I'll ask 
you to assume several facts, Doctor, which would be 
subsequent to your interview with Mr. Hoffman on 
February 5th, that he returned home, that while at 
home, he had a discussion with Carol Hoffman his wife 
wherein she indicated to him that she had .seen an at-
torney with regard to possibly seeking a divorce from 
Mr. Hoffman. That at that time he became upset, went 
downstairs and obtained a firearm. Returned upstairs, 
left the house, and subsequently encountered three 
police officers in police vehicles who attempted to 
pull him over. Turned on their sirens, followed him 
for some period of time, approximately five to ten 
minutes on the highway; whereupon Mr. Hoffman returned 
to his house. That subsequent to that, the officers 
confronted him at this vehicle, made a request for 
him to take certain actions which would include drop-
ping the firearm that he had, and exiting his vehicle. 
My question would be, assuming those facts, do you 
-7-
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have an opinion as to whether or not Mr. Hoffman's 
mental illness that you've described would have pro-
duced or controlled his responses to those stimuli 
that I have described to you. 
A. Oh, I think because of the highly unstable 
nature of his whole emotional state at that time, 
any unexpected, intense or threatening incident would 
have caused a reaction of unreasonable magnitude, and 
unpredictable reaction. 
Q. Would that reaction be a product of his mental 
illness? 
A. In my opinion it would. 
(R. 115-117) 
This testimony regarding Mr. Hoffman's mental illness was not 
disputed. 
. ARGUMENT ANn AUTHORITY 
POINT 1: THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE INSURED'S DEATH DID NOT OCCUR BY 
ACCIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INSURANCE 
POLICY IN QUESTION. 
The sole issue presented by this action is whether Louis 
Hoffman's death as a result of being shot by Salt Lake City police 
officers was caused Y,y "accident" within the meaning of the insurance 
policy in question. While this Court has not been called upon pre-
viously to decide whether injuries or death produced by the intentiona 
conduct of those other than the insured can be said to be the product 
of an accident, every jurisdiction which has considered the question 
has answered' in the affirmative. See the cases collected in· Annot.' 
-8-
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49 A.L.R.3d 67 (1973) • Many of the early decisions concerning the 
accidental nature of injuries received as the result of intentional 
acts of others involved cases wherein the insured was injured by law 
enforcement officers. While some early decisions concluded that pro-
viding coverage for injuries received in confrontations with legal 
authorities would be contrary to public policy, this logic has now 
been universally repudiated and, in the absence of a policy exclusion 
for injuries incurred as a direct result of violation of the law, the 
fact that a confrontation with police officers gives rise to the in-
juries for which benefits are sought is not viewed as a bar to re-
covery. See Anno·t., 43 A.L.R.3d 1120 (1973) ~ Indeed, in an analo-
gous case, this Court rejected the so called public policy argument 
more than 3 5 years ago in- Sanders· v. Metropolitan Life Tns .- Co. , 
104 Utah 75, 13B P.2d 239 (194~). 
In Sanders, ·su'p·ra, the Court was presented with a case wherein 
accidental death benefits were claimed as the restilt of the death of 
a boy who died from injuries received when the vehicle in which he was 
riding overturned while he and his companion were in the process of 
attempting to elude police officers. This Court held that there was 
nothing about such conduct on the part of. the insured which precluded 
recovery. The Court specifically rejected both the contention that 
benefits should be denied for violation of public policy and the 
argument that the insured's conduct in participating in a high speed 
chase while attempting to evade officers was of such a nature as to 
make his injury and death a natural and probable consequence of his 
actions. 
-9-
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It was on the basis of a similar argument by the defendant in 
this case that the Court below denied recovery to the plaintiff 
Carol Hoffman. The defendant argued, and while memorandum decision, 
findings of facts and conclusions of law don't speak to the question, 
the court apparently agreed that Mr. Hoffman's actions were of such 
a nature as to make his death at the hands of the officers a natural 
and forseeable result of his conduct. 
While the appellant would assert that such a factual finding 
would be wholly inconsistent with the evidence offered at trial show-
ing that Mr. Hoffman was not engaged in any aggressive or treatening 
conduct when shot, but rather was complying with officer Killpack's 
stated requests, appellant bel.ieves that the resolution_ of such a 
factual dispute is totally immaterial to the result of the action wher 
the proper principles of contract law are applied to this action. 
Expanding upon the logic of this Court's decision in: -Sande-rs, 
supra, many courts have now completely rejected the requirement that 
an injury, to be covered under the terms of an accident policy, must 
not have been a fores.eeable result of the decea:sed' s own conduct. 
These courts have held that such a restriction on coverage raises 
issues which are tantamount to contributory negl;Lgence and have no 
place in a contract action. 
In Mohn v.· American Casualty Co., 458 Pa. 576, 326 A.2d 346 
( 197 4) , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a case' wherein the 
plaintiff was seeking recovery under accident policies for fatal in-
juries suffered by his son, who was shot by a police officer while 
fleeing from the scene of a bu!glary he was in the pro.cess of commit-
-10-
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ting. The Court began by noti~g that in 
accident policies the law is now reasonably 
'?l:ar that the fact that events causing the 
in]ury may be traceable to an intentional 
act of a third party does not preclude the 
occurrence from being an 'accident.' Thus, 
the test of whether injury is a result of an 
accident is to· be determined from the view-
point ·of the· ·insured and not from the view-
point of the one that committed the act 
causing the injury. 
326 A.2d at 348 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
The Court went on to note that "the modern legal trend is to 
abandon the former 'reasonably foreseeable' rule and treat the occur-
ranee as accidental even though it resulted from the insured's crimi-
nal conduct." 326 A.2d at 351. This is pro.per, the Court reasoned, 
because 
(a) contract of insurance like any other 
contract requires that the intention of the 
parties be determined from the words of the 
instrument. Furthermore, where the contract 
is one of insurance any ambiguity in the lan-
guage of the document is to be read in the 
·light most strongly supporting the insured. 
Under the language of the pol.icies presently 
under consideration it ·is· cle·a·r· that no pro-
Vis·ion: was· made that condu·ct shou'ld be· ex-
c1·uded 'from cove·rage bec·ause· it p·os·ed ·an· un-
r·eason·able r·i-sk ()f· ha·rm to the deceased. · ·To 
acc·ept the narrow and~ r_e~:tric:=t7d mea'riing of 
the term ·11 acc.idental bodily in]ury" and to 
deny r:ec·overy to thi·s benef icia·ry where the 
langu·age of ·the polic~es __ c_lear:ly do. not -~up­
·port such a· construction would be violative 
of the fun:aam·e·nta'l tenets of insurance law 
and totally without Justi.fication ·in logic. 
326 A.2d at 351-352 (emphasis added). 
Other courts have also rejected the reasonably foreseeable rule 
because, as was noted in Harvey v. St. ·Paul Western Ins. Co., 166 So. 
2d 822 (Fla. App. 1964), 
-11-
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such doctrine of foreseeability is a doctrine 
totally unsuitable and unadoptable in con-
struing accident policies. Moreover, the 
rationale of these cases seems to be founded 
not only in the doctrine of foreseeability 
but intrinsically in negligence on the part 
of the insured. Were we to make this prin-
ciple a part of the law of this State, it 
would not only do vi·olence to the reason for 
buying accident insurance but if it did not 
preclude recovery in a great majority 1 of 
deaths arising from accidents, it would place 
an almost insurmountable burden on the insured 
to enforce liability. 
116 So. 2d at 823.. See also,· Be·ckham v. TraveTers Tris·. Co., 424 Pa. 
107, 225 A. 2d 532 (1967) ;· Wetzel· V; we·stirighou·se Electric Corp., 
393 A.2d 470 (Pa. 197&). 
By the same logic. employed by this Court in rejecting the notio: 
in Sanders, supra, that driving at a high rate of speed to elude ~of..:. 
ficers wasn't conduct which rendered injuries resulting from that con· 
duct nonaccidental, this Court should now hold that in the absence of 
a policy_ provision demanding a contrary result no degree of "compara-
tive fault" on the part of the insured should render injuries receive( 
by him as nonaccidental if those injuries are caused by the intention-
al conduct of others. To hold otherwise in the instant case would be 
to afford the defendant insurer an implied exclusion not specified by 
the policy itself and one which has been specifically rejected by the 
Courts of the stat.e where the company resides. See Mohn v. American 
Casualty Co., supra,· Beckham V. Tr·avelers Tns. co·., supra. 
The appellant respectfully submits that in light of the evidence 
presented in the court below it was error for the court to fail to 
enter judgment for plaintiff. 
-12-
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POINT II. AN INDIVIDUAL WHO, BY REASON OF 
MENTAL IMPAIRMENT, CANNOT RATIONALLY EVAL-
UATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS CONDUCT NOR 
CONTROL HIS ACTIONS CANNOT BE DEEMED TO 
HAVE INTENDED OR FORESEEN THE NATURAL OR 
PROBABLE RESULTS OF HIS CONDUCT. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that when viewed objectively 
the decea.sed's conduct was such as to make his death a natural and 
probable consequence of his action, and therefore not an unintended 
or unanticipated result of such acts, and that therefore his death 
would not normally be properly deemed an accident, Mr. Hoffman's men-
tal disease ·at the time he engages.in such conduct deprived him of 
the ability to make rational decisions about the consequences of his 
actions or to control his behavior in light of probable consequences 
of such conduct, which precludes application of the objective "reason-
ably foreseeable" test. 
While the respondent has argued throughout these proceedings 
that the definition of what constitutes an accident must be determined 
by "objective" criteria, every court which has considered the question 
has held that a mental impairment which deprives an individual of the 
ability to rationally evaluate the consequences of his actions, or to 
control his actions in light of their probable consequences, renders 
injuries received through such conduct accidental. This is true be-
cause one who is insane cannot be said to have "intended" the natural 
results of his actions, nor to have forseen their probable consequences 
becaµse his mental disease has deprived him of this ability. ~11 
courts considering the question, therefore, have held that injuries re-
sulting from conduct which when engaged in by a normal individual 
-13-
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might be ·said to be merely the natural, probable and foreseeable 
result of his acts, are accidentally incurred when suffered by one 
not having the mental capacity to anticipate such results. 
491 (N .J. 1.935), the Court held that an individual who was shot and 
killed by a police officer while violently resisting arrest and 
threatening the police with an axe died as a result of an accident 
within the meaning of the insurance policy in question. The Court 
noted that it was not 
questioned that the insured met his death 
by external and·violent means. We have then 
to consider the sole remaining contention of 
the defendant that he did not meet his death 
through accidental means~ 
Now an "accident," in this connection, 
is usual·ly defined as an event that takes 
place without one's foresight or expectation, 
and that definition was given recognition in 
Kennedy· v _. United State.sf. FideTitY, · ·etc.·,· Co. , 
113 N.J. Law, 431, 174·A. 531. Foresight or 
expectation, of course, imply an ability to 
think and reason. Cases to which we have been 
referred are not precisely in point, but we 
believe that the reasoning thereof discloses 
that the pertinent rule l.s this: If the rea-
soning faculties of the insured were so far 
impaired that he was not able to understand 
the moral character and general nature and 
consequences and effect· of his acts in so 
resisting arrest, and was impelled thereto by 
an insane impulse of a disordered mind which 
he had not the power to resist, such death 
was through external, violent, and accidental 
means within the meaning of the policy. 
180 A. at 492. 
This same approach was employed by the Colorado Court of Appeals 
in· Continental Casualty Company v. Maguire, 471 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 
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1970), even though ~olorado is a jurisdiction which, in the normal 
case, retains the "reasonably foreseeable" definition of an accident. 
However, faceq with a case wherein the plaintiff, who was suffering 
from a mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenic reaction, paranoid 
type, was blinded by fragments of an exploding tear gas cannister 
fired by police -officers after plaintiff had wounded an officer in 
a gun battle, the court rej.ec.ted the defendant insurer's contention 
that 
Maguire's injuries were not the result of an 
accident, but were the natural, probable, and 
foreseeable consequence of his intentional 
acts in provoking the assault by the police 
officers. However, the court found that Maguire, 
at the time of his injuries, was not engaged 
in any aggressive acts. Furthermore, no action 
· -·b'f Ma·gu'iYe '·s· ·in' :cotinection ·with this inc·ident 
was· vo·1untary o·r wrongful because· he· was insane 
·at the· time . 
471 P.2d at 628 (emphasis added). 
See also, Williams v. Prudential Ins. Co., 271 I.11. App. 532 
(1933); Tuttle v. "Iowa State Travel·ing Me.n's Ass'n, 104 N.W. 1131 
(Iowa 1905) . 
While the particular question herein presented has not been 
widely litigated, in every reported decision where it has been raised 
the court has held that injuries suffered by a mentally impaired in-
sured as a result of an intentional act of another in response to 
insured's own conduct are injuries caused by accident. Appellant 
would submit that this is an appropriate result in all such cases and 
urge this Court to adopt the position shared by all other jurisdic-
tions having considered the question. 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Such a holding would be entirely in accord with previous de-
cisions of this Court which have recognized that determinations 
about what does or does not fall within the meaning of the term ac-
cident must include the subjective facts about the insured which are 
known by the Court. 
The defendant urged upon the trial court the proposition that 
the question of the foreseeability of the result of Mr. Hoffman's 
actions must be judged by an objective standard and that if the re-
sult was foreseeable to a. reasonable person, then· the result was not 
an accident because it was not "an unexpected or unanticipated occur-
rence." Handley v. Mutual Li.f"e· Tns •· Co., 106 Utah 184, .14 7 P. 2d 319 
(1944). While there is no indication in the court's findings, con-
clusions ·or memorandum decision,·· apparently the trial court accepted 
this objective test fn determining that Mr. Hoffman's shooting was 
not unexpected or unforeseeable from his conduct. However, Utah law 
has never adopted an obj.ecti ve test for determining if a particular 
result of an act constitutes an accident. That_our.law has.always 
regarded such a determination to be based on .the subjective circumstanc 
attendant to the particular insured can be seen by comparison of two 
cases with differing results involving what appear to be identical 
circumstances when viewed "objectively," but which produce different 
results because the actual test of whether or not a particular result 
is an accident is subjective, based upon what is known about he in-
sured when the acts occur. 
In Handley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, the Court considered 
a claim for accidental death benefits made by the widow of an insured 
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who died as a resu_l t of complications following surgery. After 
acknowle~ging that an .accident, within the meaning of an insurance 
policy, can be the product of actions do.ne intentionally if such acts 
produce unexpected results, the Court held that the insured died as 
a result of an accident because the medical complications which caused 
his death were not expected, nor anticipated nor reasonably foresee-
able as a result of his surgery.. See also, Whatcott v. Continental 
Cas. Co . , 8 5 Utah 4 0 6 , 3 9 P • 2d 7 3 3 ( 1.9 3 5) • 
An apparently -contrary ·result was reached in XeTlogg v. Cali-
'fornia Western· ·Life· Tn:s·; Co_., 201 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1949), wherein the 
Court held that a widow was not entitl~d to accidental death benefits 
when her husband died fr·om .post-operative shock caused by his surgery. 
After acknowledging the holdings bf the previously decided cases find-
ing coverage-under apparently similar facts, the Court noted that in 
this case, because of the subjective facts :particular to the insured, 
his death was a foreseeable result of the s·urgery because he had pre-
viously exhibited a susceptability to shock symptoms following sur-
. gery, his physical c.o.ndition for which surgery was necessary was such 
that a prolonged operation and administration of a.nesthetic was re.:. 
quired, thus increasing the normal risk of shock due to surgery, and 
he was in such a genera_lly weakened condition prior to surgery that 
the risk of his death from the conditions caused by the surgery was 
highly foreseeable.. The Court reasoned that it was not appropriate 
to view the cases as "objectively" the same. 
Each individual may be considered the 
average individual unless the facts dis-
close that in reality he is not; and when 
the facts do so show, then the question 
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of the accidental nature of the result 
must be measured by this knowledge-. 
201 P.2d at 952. 
These decisions show that the subjective circumstances of the 
insured must be considered in determining if a particular result has 
occur.red by accident. As previously not~d, it is ;Erom the viewpoint 
of the insured that the unexpected or unanticipated nature of the 
results must be examined, and due to his mental illness Louis Hoffman 
was incapable of anticipating what a reasonable person might have 
foreseen, or making any reasonable judgment about the possible or 
probable consequences of his actions . 
. CONCLUSION 
In the present case, the policy of insurance contains no pro-
visions excluding coverage for violation of law or for conduct creat-
ing an unreasonable risk of harm. Under such circumstances the better 
reasoned decisions conclude that proper application of contract prin-
ciples requires a finding of coverage.. However, consideration of 
that issue isn't.necessary because even those jurisdictions which 
still adopt the reasonably foreseeable rule, and deny coverage for 
injuries which are a natural incident of the insured's own conduct, 
recognize an exception when the insured is mentally impaired, as the 
evidence clearly shows Mr. Hoffman to have been. Because he was men-
tally incapable of foreseeing the natural consequences of his action, 
Mr. Hoffman's death was "accidental" within the universally accepted 
meaning of that term, it having been established that he died by vio-
lent and external means while severely mentally impaired. 
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Based upon the foregoing authority, appellant respectfully re-
quests that the judgment entered below be reversed and the case re-
manded for entry of judgment for appellant, together with her costs 
and prejudgment interest. 
DATED this day of March, 1982. 
---
M. DAVID ECKERSLEY// 
Attorney for Plain'.tiff 
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